THE COUNSELS OF THE ALLIKS. 183 ' these two districts could not be supported at chap. ' need by forces witlidrawn from the other one.* L._ ' You speak of our want of good means of re- ' treat in the event of a discomfiture ; but this ' is a source of danger inherent in the enterprise ' to which, whether wisely or not, we are now ' committed. We encountered it at the landing, ' we encountered it in our march from Old Fort, ' we encountered it on the Alma ; but on that ' last day we greatly reduced its gravity by prov- ' ing our ascendant in the field; and now that, ' with our victorious armies, we approach the ' goal of our enterprise, it can hardly be wise to ' revive the old objection, and to refrain from ' attacking Sebastopol on the theory that, if we ' were to be repulsed, we should need to abandon ' the Chersonese, and yet be unable to secure our ' retreat. If the attack of the place we came out ' to take is, in other respects, prudent, we must ' not forego the occasion on account of a danger ' which belongs to the very nature of our euter- ' prise, and is not to be evaded by delay. If we ' are already so circumstanced as to be unable to ' effect a good retreat after undergoing discom- ' fiture in an assault on Sebastopol, how can we ' expect to be better prepared for a like contin- ' gency when we have taken upon ourselves the additional task of saving and re-embarking our ' cumbersome siege-trains ? ' You acknowledge that a main portion of the • General de Todleben insists, with great force, upon this as one of the greatest of the evils with which the heticged had to deal.
