194 THE COUNSELS OF THE ALLIES. CHAP. * batteries and infantry lliaii any avo can hope to ^ ' construct in the same time.* 'Yet again, think of the policy of delay as ' affected by the season of the year. We are
- nearly at the end of September. These Avarm,
' sunny days that we have had ever since the ' 14th, will be followed by the winds, the rains, ' the cold of autumn. Nay, force yourselves to
- think of the winter, for if once you come to the
' business of a siege, no man can say how long it ' will last. In means of providing against the ' rigour of the season, there is no approach to ' equality between the enemy and ourselves. ' The enemy will have at his back a whole town, ' with hundreds of buildings of all kinds, includ- ' ing barracks and hospitals, and supplied with ' the stores that are needed for keeping an army ' in health. Our troops, on the other hand, with ' no other shelter than tents, will be lying up
- So early as the Stli of October Lord Raglan had perceived
that the business of 'subduing the enemy's fire ' by superior cannonading power was 'an almost hopeless task.' — Private letter (quoted more at length, fost, p. 212) from Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle. In a letter addressed by Lord Raglan to General Canrobert at the close of the 3'ear, he had occasion to speak of the day when the besiegers oj)ened fire, and he de- scribes the cannonading power then exerted by the enemy as amounting to 'at least double that of the Allies.' It may be said that nothing but actual observation and experience suf- ficed to teach the Allies their inferiority in cannonading power, and that, therefore, the argument in the text could not have been used. I veAy that, from the time when the Allies knew of the sinking of the ships across the mouth of the roadstead, they had before them the data from which it was competent to them to infer the great amount of power which would or might be developed by the enemy's batteries.
