212 THE COUNSELS OF THE ALLIES. CHAP, time apparently no trnstwortliy estimate had been ' made of the number of days it would take to laud the siege-trains, to get them up to the front, and to provide earthen cover for the projected batteries.* Another of the circumstances tending to avert discussion was one which has been already re- ferred to for another purpose ; and that is, the exceeding confidence of the Engineers, whether English or French, and this, upon a subject which — partly, at least, if not altogether — lay within the range of their special science. They not only judged that the idea of an immediate assault was one of so rash a sort as to be actually unworthy of discussion, •]- but were also very sure, at the time, that their plan of getting down the enemy's fire by means of their siege-guns M'ould bring about the fall of the place.J Add to this that the opinion of the Allied Engineers was sup-
- For the reasons showing that such an estimate might havfl
lieen made see the footnote ante, p. 190. + This was Sir John Burgoyne's opinion, see ante, p. 18], ami note. With respect to the opinion in the French canip, and the determination of General Canrobert, see the quotation from the Narrative of the French General of Division, quoted ante, p. 172, and given in Note to the ' Expedition de la Crimee,' p. 300. + In a jirivate letter addressed by Lord Eaglaii to the Duke of Newcastle he says : ' Since I wrote to you this morning ' I have had a serious conversation with Sir John Burgoyne. ' He was very sanguine of success at lirst, and considered that ' we had no very great obstacles to contend against, but he has ' gradually amved at a different conclusion ; and he now ap- ' prehends that the force we can command is wholly inadequate ' to the real attack of the front of the place to which we are • opposed.'- 8th October 1851.
