THE PART TO BE TAKEN CHAP. XI. their joint letter to tlio Admirals. The ill pros- pect this measure offered to the Naval forces. adc — that is, lialf-past six in the morning — would be also the most fitting time for the ships to open their fire.* In the joint letter conveying this de- cision, the Generals applauded ' the great resolve' to which the Admirals had come, and ventured an opinion that, by the common action of the fleets and the armies conjoined,' moral and material ef- ' fects' would be produced which must 'insure the ' success of the attack upon SebastopoL' They also intimated that the attack M'ould begin at half-past six in the morning, and ended by an- nouncing that an entire cessation of the fire from the trenches was to be taken as a signal that the moment for the assault had come.f Regarded separately, and apart from any ad- vantage which a naval diversion might confer upon the land forces, the Allied fleet, when thus invoked, had no clear prospect thrown open to it except a prospect of failure. Lyons came to see this, we know, before the day of the action ;J and Dun das, more calm than his second in command,
- Written communication from General Canrobert and Lord
liaglan — date, the 16th October. t The letter, 16th October 1854, was signed bj' Lord Eaglan as well as by Canrobert, but it had been drawn u]) by the French ; and I imagine that, if time could have been found for mere literaiy changes, Lord Ruglan would have liked to ex- clude the part about 'great i-csolvo,' 'moral effects,' and cer- tainty of success. The arrangement which the French expanded into the form of the joint letter was come to by Canrobert and Lord Raglan in the presence of General Rose and Colonel Trochu, and was recorded by a memorandum now lying before me in the handwriting of Colonel Trochu.
- J: See his letter of the IGth October to Lord linglan, quoted
ante.