THE APEIL BOMBARDMENT. ] 97 ' since they found themselves at a distance from chap. VI ' it of only some hundred paces.' * ' After stating that the Allies had planned assaults, and failed to execute them, he goes on to say : — ' It is thus that the Allies failed to ' profit by the important advantage they had ob- ' tained ; yet they had it completely in their ' power to take the Flagstaff Bastion, and that ' would have carried with it the fall of Sebas- ' topol. Let us remember that, like the rest of ' the defences, the Flagstaff Bastion had been ' never secure against an attack by assault, and ' that at this time from the effect of a prolonged ' bombardment, it was in a state of half ruin, ' because a part of its salient had fallen in. ' Each day, after a firing of some hours, its ' artillery was thrown into a state of complete ' disorder, and it happened several times that ' the Work could only fire with two guns. The ' violent fire of mortars under which the Bas- ' tion was constantly kept forbade our keeping ' there more than a weak garrison ; and even this ' was not kept within the Work itself, but placed ' under cover in rear of the gorge, for other- ' wise the enemy's shells must have inevitably ' destroyed the whole force.' ' Under such conditions, the besieger, with the ' power of choosing his own day and his own hour ' for the assault, would always have been able ' to anticipate our troops on the ramparts of ' the Bastion.' t
- Todleben, p. 182. + Ibid., p. 185.
