IN THE "WAll AGAINST RUSSIA. 13."> of 1841 ; and since tins resolve led straight into chap. the series of naval movements which followed, _ j and so on to the outbreak of war, the members of the Sultan's Cabinet had some right to believe that, even without the counsels of the great Am- bassador, they knew how to govern events. In so far as the origin of the war was connected share wiiich •,in iT-- I •• 1 J • • Austria had. with Count Lemmgen s mission, Austria is answer- able ; and although it must needs be true (for so she firmly declares*) that the Czar's reiterated ac- count of his close understanding with her in re- gard to Montenegro vas purely fabulous, she still remains open to the grave charge of having sent Count Leiningeu to Constantinople armed with a long string of questionable claims, yet debarred by his orders from all negotiation, and instructed to receive no answer from the Turkish Govern- ment except an answer of simple consent or simple refusal. This offensive method of pressiu" upon an independent Sovereign was constantly referred to by the Czar as justifying and almost compelling his determination to deal with the Sultan in a high-handed fashion ; and in this way • I have a statement to this efTect. To those who have iiut Leeu called upon to test the relative worth of statements com- ing from diflercut parts of Europe, it may seem that I am facile in accepting this one ; and the more so when 1 acknowledge, as I do, that surrounding facts give an a]>pearance of probability to the opposite assertion. The truth is, that, like our own countrymen, the public men of Austria are much accustomed to subordinate their zeal for the public service to their self-respect. To undertake to disbelieve a statesman of the Court of Vienna, is the came thing as to uudertake to disbelieve an English gentleman.
