FOR THE INVASION. 289 enemy's coast, with all his divisions of infau- chap. • XVII try, with his brigade of light cavalry, and with '__ the whole of his field-artillery ; and he would be enabled, if he landed in face of an enemy, to bring his guns into action whilst his infantry formed upon the beach. When the allied commanders determined to ineffectual attemiits of execute the orders addressed to them, they saw the Auiea _ _ , to deceive the importance of endeavouring to veil their pro- the enemy, ject from the enemy. With this view they tried to induce a belief that Odessa was to be the object of attack ; but the measures which they took for this purpose were very slight and weak. To de- ceive the enemy by the mere spreading of a report, the first step for a general to takii would be that of uttering the false word to some of his own people. That would be a difficult service for Lord Raglan to perform ; and I do not believe that he ever could or ever did perform it. Another contrivance for diverting the enemy's attention from the Crimea was that of endeavour- ing to alarm him for his Bessarabian frontier. Partly to attain this end, and partly, as was sur- mised, with the more ambitious object of striking a blow at some of the Czar's retiring columns, Marshal St Arnaud moved no less than three divisions into the Dobrudja. But, in truth, all secrecy was forbidden to the Allies. The same power which dictated the expedition precluded its concealment. It was in a council of the whole people that England had resolved upon tlic enter- prise ; and'what advantage there is in knowlcd;::e VOL. II. T