then divulges what he had sworn to keep secret,—where is the
difference as to all practical purposes, or as to the actual guilt
of perjury? But again, suppose that the wise man was to act
as the Sanhedrin did, and absolve the man without summoning
the person to whom he swore, it is a question whether the servant
would then he bound. Zedekiah evidently thought not.
All he was concerned about was to have absolution, and if there
was any sin in giving it, he evidently thought that the onus
rested upon those who gave, and not upon him who received it.
According to the oral law, the Sanhedrin was wrong in giving
absolution under the circumstances: but, according to the same
oral law, Zedekiah was right in obeying their decision. Implicit
and universal obedience to the words of the Sanhedrin
and wise men is required by the Talmud; and, therefore, if a
wise man give absolution, even though he give it unlawfully,
it is still the duty of him who is absolved to obey his decision,
and act upon it. A Rabbinist is not allowed to reason; but as
we have seen on a former occasion, to believe that his right
hand is his left, and vice versa, if the rabbies say so—and, consequently,
if a wise man absolve him, he is not to trouble either
his conscience or his reason as to the right or the wrong; his
duty is not to dispute, but to receive the determination as the
words of the living God. The provision, therefore, that if
Simeon swear to Reuben he is not to be absolved, except in
Reuben's presence, affords but little protection. If it was possible
for the Sanhedrin, a body consisting of seventy-one persons,
to disregard it, it is surely possible that any other wise man
might disregard it also, and absolve Simeon, even in Reuben's
absence. Now the bare possibility of such occurrences would
make all promises, whether sanctioned by oaths or not, of no
value, and have the most pernicious effect as to the practice of
speaking truth. Men might reason from the greater to the less,
and say, If it be lawful, by means of absolution, to break an
oath, (Hebrew characters), à fortiori, it is lawful to break one's word
without absolution; and, at all events, those to whom the promise
was given would be likely to reason thus, and say, If we
cannot depend upon this man's oath, much less can we place
confidence in his word. But what is worse still, such a doctrine
is calculated to make men despise all religion, and to render
them a prey to infidelity. The thoughtless and the rash are
very likely to say, If this be religion, better far to be without
it; or, to conclude that as such doctrine cannot possibly be the
offspring of the Divine mind, all revealed religion is a mere imposture.
In every case it is a reproach to the good sense and
piety of Israel to profess such a doctrine; or, if they do not
believe it, to remain silent, and suffer mankind to suppose that
this is the religion of the children of Abraham. So long as they
profess that the oral law is the source of their religion, so long
Page:The old paths, or The Talmud tested by Scripture.djvu/464
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