Page:The passing of Korea.djvu/276

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THE PASSING OF KOREA

at the beginning of the war, to preserve the independence of Korea, but it now appeared that that promise was made solely as a preparation for the act which was to follow. The seizure of Korea and the extinction of her independence has been called a logical outcome of events. Russia had agreed to recognise Japan's preponderating influence in Korea, but what had that to do with Japan's definite and explicit promise to preserve the independence of Korea? It was evidently only the removal of the last obstacle which stood in the way of the breaking of that promise. But Japan saw that it would be necessary to proceed with caution. The only way to secure a protectorate without a manifest breach of faith was, first, to secure the acquiescence of the Korean government. If Korea could be induced to ask Japan to assume a protectorate, all would go well. Here was the crux of the situation.

Early in the autumn of 1905 the Emperor was approached with this suggestion, but he repudiated it instantly. He recognised the predominance of Japanese power in Korea and acquiesced in the advisorships in the various departments, but when it came to turning over the whole government and nation bodily to Japan, without the least hope of a future rehabilitation of the national independence, he refused in the plainest terms. He saw very well that the Japanese were determined to carry the day, but he knew that if he held firm it could not be done without arousing the indignation of the world. He determined to lodge a protest at Washington, forestalling violent action on the part of Japan. The first clause of the treaty of 1883 between Korea and the United States says that if either of the contracting parties is injured by a third party the other shall interfere with her good offices to effect an amicable settlement.

It was .impossible to lodge this protest in Washington through the Korean Foreign Office, for that was in control of a person thoroughly " in the sleeve " of Japan. The only thing to do was to send a personal and private communication to the President of the United States, calling attention to Japanese