and there in Egyptian Mythology,"[1] the whole presenting a strange conglomeration, which appears to defy any attempt to make a consistent theology of it, until we see Plutarch's method conspicuously emerging with its twofold aim, of proving that all these different views of God are merely different ways of striving after belief in the same Supreme Power, and of inculcating a sympathetic and liberal attitude of mind, which is far more conducive to unity than a detailed agreement on points of minor importance.[2] This endeavour after unity is supported by a strenuous and sincere belief in what at first sight appears to be a principle of diversity—the belief, namely, in Dæmons—but which Plutarch uses to great effect in his attempts after unity, by assigning, with Pythagoras,[3] every recognized tradition unworthy of the Highest to these subordinate beings
- ↑ Amatorius, 762 A.
- ↑ One need scarcely go so far as Professor Lewis Campbell, who says that the main result of the "Ethics" of Plutarch is to show "how difficult it was for a common-sense man of the world to form distinct and reasonable opinions on matters of religion in that strangely complicated time" (Religion in Greek Literature, 1898). But Professor Campbell is also of opinion that "the convenient distinction between gods and demons, which he (i.e. Plutarch) and others probably owed to their reading of Plato, is worth dwelling on because it was taken up for apologetic purposes by the early Christian fathers." Surely its religious value to an age which did not anticipate the coming of "the early Christian fathers" makes the distinction worth study from a point of view quite different from that represented in Christian apologetics.
- ↑ See Maury, vol. i. p. 352.—"Pythagore admet l'existence de démons bons et mauvais comme les hommes, et tout ce qui lui paraissait indigne de l'idée qu'on devait se faire des dieux, il en faisait l'œuvre des démons et des héros." (For a fuller discussion of this question see the chapters on Dæmonology.)
