This examination of the story of Timarchus lends a strong support to the statement already made respecting Plutarch's use of myth. In the "De Sera Numinis Vindicta" we saw that he could not accept as a subject of rational demonstration the theory of rewards and punishments in a future life; but so convinced is he of the ethical value of that belief that he has recourse to a most solemn myth, which he clearly hopes will operate for goodness through the imagination if not through the intellect. The myth embodied in the "De Dæmonio Socratis" has a similar origin and an identical aim. How important to a man in his efforts after Goodness to know that he is under the observation of a Being whose half-human, half-divine nature, fits him equally to feel sympathy and administer aid! That is an aspect of Plutarch's teaching which requires no emphasis to-day. . . . With the Plutarchean doctrine of Dæmons is also involved the sublimely moral notion of eternal endeavour after a higher and more perfect goodness. The human being who earnestly strives to be good within the limits of his present opportunities will have a larger sphere of activity thrown open to him as a Dæmon in the Afterworld. The human soul transfigured into the strength and splendour of this higher nature has work to perform which may develop such qualities as will bring their owner into closer proximity with the Highest Divine. The doctrine of Dæmons, as expounded by Plutarch, involves the
- [Footnote: duties they are punished by being driven again to earth to enter
human bodies once more (944 D; cf. 944 C).]
