way of solving that question in one direction is expounded in the tract "De Superstitione."[1]
While Plutarch, in his anxiety to safeguard the emotional aspects of Religion from the incursions of Superstition, departs in this tract from his ordinary attitude of intellectual moderation, he reverts very markedly to his usual manner in his treatise on the two Egyptian divinities, Isis and Osiris. Knowledge of the Truth is here depicted as the very heart of devotion, and the pursuit of this is regarded as the only means of holding a middle path between the bog of Superstition and the precipice of Atheism. The main object of this treatise is to show how principles of rational inquiry may be applied to religious myths, so that Reason and Piety may both be satisfied with the result. Wyttenbach explains this purpose in a few words of terse Latinity which might safely be quoted as descriptive of Plutarch's attitude towards Religion in general. "Consilium scriptoris videtur fuisse, ut amicam de horum Ægyptiorum numinum ortu et cultu saniora, quam quæ vulgo ferrentur, doceret, religionemque fabularum deliriis cærimoniarumque ineptiis mirifice deformatam et apud prudentiores homines in contemtum adductam, istis quoad ejus fieri posset sordibus purgaret, omnique literarum et philosophiæ instrumento ad historiæ fidem, naturæ
- ↑ The view taken in the text as to the character of this strenuous and noble sermon on Superstition is, of course, quite at variance with the opinion of Prof. Mahaffy, who regards it as "one of those sophistical exercises practised by every one in that age—I mean, the defence of a paradox with subtlety and ingenuity, taking little account of sober truth in comparison with dialectical plausibility."—Greeks under Roman Sway, p. 318.
