Page:The religion of Plutarch, a pagan creed of apostolic times; an essay (IA religionofplutar00oakeiala).pdf/240

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defect of either of the co-operating agencies.[1] Referring to a favourite illustration, he maintains that the passions are not to be uprooted and destroyed as Lycurgus uprooted and destroyed the vineyards of Thracia, but are to be treated with the fostering gentleness of a god who would prune the wild, trim the rank, and carefully cultivate the healthy and productive portions of the plant.[2] If we wish to avoid drunkenness we need not throw our wine away; we must temper it with water. In like manner, Reason will not act "by harsh and obstinate methods, but by gentle means, which convey persuasion and secure submission more effectively than any sort of compulsion."[3] It is quite in harmony with this essentially practical view of life that he holds that Virtue can be taught, and that it is through the persuasion, and by the guidance, of Reason and Philosophy that a happy life can be secured, inasmuch as their efforts are directed at counterbalancing the exaggerated picture which passion draws of all the circumstances of life, whether they are fortunate or the reverse.[4] It is this principle which he applies to the discussion of topics of practical morality, as he applies it to the discussion of questions of Religion. The practice of the virtues based upon this principle is most vividly exhibited in his "Symposiacs," a work which is of considerable value for the light it throws upon the family and private

  1. 444 C, D. (Cf. 451.)
  2. 444 D. Cf. Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat, 15 E.
  3. 445 C.
  4. "An virtus doceri possit," "de virtute et vitio," 101, C, D.