gency of the State therefore this tax might be intended to supply, that exigency would be chiefly supplied at the expense of the poor, not of the rich; at the expense of those who are least able to supply it, not of those who are most able.
Thirdly, if government should at any time neglect the reparation of the highroads, it would be still more difficult than it is at present to compel the proper application of any part of the turnpike tolls. A large revenue might thus be levied upon the people, without any part of it being applied to the only purpose to which a revenue levied in this manner ought ever to be applied. If the meanness and poverty of the trustees of turnpike roads render it sometimes difficult at present to oblige them to repair their wrong, their wealth and greatness would render it ten times more so in the case which is here supposed.
In France, the funds destined for the reparation of the highroads are under the immediate direction of the executive power. Those funds consist, partly in a certain number of days' labor which the country people in most parts of Europe are obliged to give to the reparation of the highways, and partly in such a portion of the general revenue of the State as the king chooses to spare from his other expenses.
By the ancient law of France, as well as by that of most other parts of Europe, the labor of the country people was under the direction of a local or provincial magistracy, which had no immediate dependence upon the king's council. But by the present practice both the labor of the country people, and whatever other fund the king may choose to assign for the reparation of the highroads in any particular province or generality, are entirely under the
