THINGS AND WORDS. 307 the name than the thing itself. Be. In some sort of things, I confess, that many had rather have the thing than the name ; but in many things it is quite the contrary. Bo. 1 don't very well take you in. Be. We have an example of it in ourselves. You are called Boniface, and you have what you are called ; but if you were to be deprived of either of them, had you rather have an ugly face or be called Cornelius? Bo. Why, indeed, I had rather be called Thersites than have a face as ugly as the devil : whether I have a handsome one now or not I can- not tell. Be. Then, again, if I was rich and must either part with my wealth or my name, I had rather be called Irus than be deprived of my estate. Bo. I grant what you say to be true, and I am of opinion it is the common temper of those that enjoy health and other corporeal enjoyments. Bo. It is probable. Be. But how many may we see that had rather have the name of being learned and pious than to be learned and pious? Bo. I know a great many of this sort of people. Be. Well, then, is not the name more esteemed among us than the thing itself? Bo. So it seems to be. Be. Now, if we had a good logician, who could properly define what a king, a bishop, a magistrate, and a philosopher was, it is very likely we should find some among them who are more for the name than the thing itself. Bo. He is really a king who aims at the good of his people, and not his own, governing them by law and justice; and he a bishop who watches carefully over the Lord's flock; and he is a magistrate who sincerely studies the good of the public. And a philosopher is one who, neglecting the goods of fortune, studies only to get the endowments of the mind. Be. By these you may see how many examples of this kind I could produce. Bo. Why, truly, a great many. Be. Will you deny all these to be men? Bo. I am afraid we shall sooner lose the name of men ourselves. Be. But if man is a rational animal, how contrary is it to reason that in the conveniences, rather than the real goods of the body, and in external things which fortune gives and takes away at her pleasure we had rather have the thing itself than the name, and in the real goods of the mind we put more value upon the name than the thing itself. Bo. It is an absurd way of judging, if a man did but con- sider it seriously. Be. And the reason is quite the same in those things that are on the contrary side. Bo. I expect what you are going to say. Be. We may pass the same judgment as to the names of those things that are to be avoided as has been given as to those that are to be desired. Bo. That is plain. Be. For to be a tyrant is more to be abhorred than to have the name ; and if a bishop be a bad man, the scripture calls him a thief and a robber. These names are not to be detested by us so much as the things themselves. Be. In truth, I am of your mind. Bo. Do you infer the same as to the rest? Bo. I understand you perfectly well. Be. Do not all fools hate to be called fools ? Bo. Yes, indeed, and more than other folks. Be. Would not he be a fool that should fish with a golden hook, and prefer glass before jewels ? that should put more value upon his horses than his wife and children ? Bo. He would be a greater fool than Ben of the Minories. Be. Are not they such fools that list themselves for soldiers, and for the sake of a poor pay expose body and soul to danger ? who make it their study to scrape
