which, however, were made dependent upon circumstances, and upon directions I might receive from the agents in the States, under whose orders I was to act.
This plan for a grand raid by way of the lakes excited my enthusiasm greatly, and I had very strong hopes of its success. I knew how desperate the situation at the South was getting to be, and felt that a diversion of this kind, which would excite terror in the hearts of the people of the North, and which would probably cause a considerable force to be withdrawn from the front, would help the Confederate cause at this particular juncture more, even, than a series of brilliant victories on the well-trodden battle-grounds of the South. A large number of the people of the North were, I knew, get ting heartily sick of the war, and I thought that it would only need a brilliant movement for transferring some of the fighting and some of the desolation to Northern ground, to cause the anti-war policy to demand that peace should be had at any price. Whether the proposed raid would have accomplished all that was expected of it, can, of course, never be determined. It is probable, however, that I, as well as others interested, underrated the difficulties of executing such a complicated scheme. Be that as it may, something could have been done, more than was done, had everybody been as enthusiastic and as determined as myself, and had there been no traitors with us. The scheme failed, when it should have been, at least, partly successful ; but it need not have failed so utterly as it did, had it been managed with wisdom, backed up by true daring.
