Page:Theory of Mind of Roger Bacon.djvu/11

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With Species so described, the importance of this theory for his Philosophy of Mind becomes apparent at once. And, indeed, Bacon directly calls attention to the vital importance of his treatise, on the Propagation of Species, for the understanding of his theory of Perception; the latter cannot be understood at all without the former.^[1] And conversely the action of the mind upon the body is explained by use of the same theory.^[2] In fact, all phenomena of qualitative change in the one world (spiritualia) as in the other (corporalia), and in their interaction, are to be brought within the scope of this single, far-reaching hypothesis.^[3] There is apparently no realm left untouched^[4] by the “laws of the propagation of Species, which the sense of sight follows in common with all other senses, and with the whole machine of the universe.”^[5] And as one turns the pages whereon lie registered the hopes and expectations of our Author for this theory of his, he knows not which to admire the more, the genius that could give meaning to his thought, or the courage that could face its full execution. Certain it is, in any case, that it forms “the warp and the woof” for his Philosophy of Mind.

1. THE SETTING OF THE THEORY.

It has already been indicated, that Bacon’s theory of Species is an attempt to explain change of a certain kind; not change in position, nor change in quantity, but change in quality.^[6] This fur-

↑ See II—40, cf. Br. 321 and Ep. 611. Also Br. 36; II—3; Br. 114; II—425. For Aristotle the notion of assimilation is of similar importance for sense-perception; see De An. II, ch. V, init.
↑ E.g. I—396ff.
↑ See III—184ff. "… primo … in corporalibus agentibus et patientibus, secundo in spiritualibus ad invicem et respectu corporalium. In corporalibus vero etc. … Et capitulo X ut tangit spirituals substantiales." The "cap. X" is wanting. This preamble is from a MS. in the British Museum (Add. MSS. No. 8786). It is apparently referred to in the De Mult. Spec, ("prologus istius operis," 513). Emile Charles saw it (op. cit. 231), and Brewer quotes in part from it (Br. lii. ff.). It is an occasion for keen regret that the "cap. X" is wanting. Did he actually write it? Charles conjectures not. But certain considerations must not be overlooked. He intended the theory to apply to mental as well as physical phenomena (I—111, "tarn spirituales quam corporales"). In the Opus Majus he treats of just such phenomena and in such wise as to presuppose a fuller treatment elsewhere (I—216ff., 398ff.; II—159ff.). In the Opus Tertium, written after the De Mult. Spec, had been sent to the Pope, he makes a direct application of the theory to the problem of the Intellectus Agens (Br. 76ff.). In the De Mult. Spec, direct reference is made to this "cap. X" (II 417, 457). And the MS. of this treatise breaks off abruptly (p. 551); what follows ("Videlicet" etc.) to the end is repetition of pp. 414, 415. It seems most likely that the copyist simply failed to copy further; and that this repetition is a marginal note (cf. Ill 187, for 544 and 551).

For the reciprocal action cf. above note. Perception is only a special case. The Species is the same whether it acts upon the senses or the understanding or matter, see II—417, cf. I—111. Emile Charles sees this, op. cit. 231.
↑ Thus, God's propagation of the Species or Forms which He brought into being by creation (I—III cf. C. N. 22, Ep. 512); the Angels' control of the movements of the celestial bodies (I—III cf. 120), and the mutual influence of these bodies upon each other (I—130); the generation, by the sun and stars, of all terrestrial life (I—120, cf. 378); the generation of the sensitive soul (v. inf. ch. II); the rational soul's control of its body (I—402ff.); the perception of the external world (v. sup. cf. inf. ch. III); the same soul's influence upon persons and things (I—142, 143, here also his striking application to health and disease, cf. 398ff., II—401ff.); the influence upon both soul and body from the celestial bodies (1138, 189, 249ff., 376ff.); the body's infection of other bodies (I—398ff., cf. II—143ff.); and the propagation of light, as the type of all propajgation (II—458ff., cf. I—216. He speaks of the treatise as "De Radiis," Br. 227, 230). See further I—127ff.; Br. 37, 38, 75ff., 99, 107, 117, 321; C. N. 16ff.
↑ See Br. 37 cf. 117.
↑ With Aristotle, the attempt is distinctly to supersede the mechanical with a theory

[1] See II—40, cf. Br. 321 and Ep. 611. Also Br. 36; II—3; Br. 114; II—425. For Aristotle the notion of assimilation is of similar importance for sense-perception; see De An. II, ch. V, init.

[2] E.g. I—396ff.

[3] See III—184ff. "… primo … in corporalibus agentibus et patientibus, secundo in spiritualibus ad invicem et respectu corporalium. In corporalibus vero etc. … Et capitulo X ut tangit spirituals substantiales." The "cap. X" is wanting. This preamble is from a MS. in the British Museum (Add. MSS. No. 8786). It is apparently referred to in the De Mult. Spec, ("prologus istius operis," 513). Emile Charles saw it (op. cit. 231), and Brewer quotes in part from it (Br. lii. ff.). It is an occasion for keen regret that the "cap. X" is wanting. Did he actually write it? Charles conjectures not. But certain considerations must not be overlooked. He intended the theory to apply to mental as well as physical phenomena (I—111, "tarn spirituales quam corporales"). In the Opus Majus he treats of just such phenomena and in such wise as to presuppose a fuller treatment elsewhere (I—216ff., 398ff.; II—159ff.). In the Opus Tertium, written after the De Mult. Spec, had been sent to the Pope, he makes a direct application of the theory to the problem of the Intellectus Agens (Br. 76ff.). In the De Mult. Spec, direct reference is made to this "cap. X" (II 417, 457). And the MS. of this treatise breaks off abruptly (p. 551); what follows ("Videlicet" etc.) to the end is repetition of pp. 414, 415. It seems most likely that the copyist simply failed to copy further; and that this repetition is a marginal note (cf. Ill 187, for 544 and 551).

For the reciprocal action cf. above note. Perception is only a special case. The Species is the same whether it acts upon the senses or the understanding or matter, see II—417, cf. I—111. Emile Charles sees this, op. cit. 231.

[4] Thus, God's propagation of the Species or Forms which He brought into being by creation (I—III cf. C. N. 22, Ep. 512); the Angels' control of the movements of the celestial bodies (I—III cf. 120), and the mutual influence of these bodies upon each other (I—130); the generation, by the sun and stars, of all terrestrial life (I—120, cf. 378); the generation of the sensitive soul (v. inf. ch. II); the rational soul's control of its body (I—402ff.); the perception of the external world (v. sup. cf. inf. ch. III); the same soul's influence upon persons and things (I—142, 143, here also his striking application to health and disease, cf. 398ff., II—401ff.); the influence upon both soul and body from the celestial bodies (1138, 189, 249ff., 376ff.); the body's infection of other bodies (I—398ff., cf. II—143ff.); and the propagation of light, as the type of all propajgation (II—458ff., cf. I—216. He speaks of the treatise as "De Radiis," Br. 227, 230). See further I—127ff.; Br. 37, 38, 75ff., 99, 107, 117, 321; C. N. 16ff.

[5] See Br. 37 cf. 117.

[p11-6] With Aristotle, the attempt is distinctly to supersede the mechanical with a theory

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Page:Theory of Mind of Roger Bacon.djvu/11

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