Page:Theory of Mind of Roger Bacon.djvu/18

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this first effect produced, we should have the Species, to be sure, but nothing effected through them. And while the study of both is really the same, still the univocal effect must be understood first.[1]

As univocal effect, the Species is so like the Agent that it is all but numerically identical with it.[2] On the one hand, we may regard it as of the same essence and nature as the Agent; on the other hand, as in the “specie specialissima” with its Agent.[3] Or, we may combine the two viewpoints, and call it of the same specific essence as its Agent.[4] However we express it, therefore, it differs only numerically from its Agent. In short, the Species of Substance is Substance, and of Accident is Accident; and so of Composite and Simple and Matter and Form and Universal and Particular—the Species of each of these is just what each is.[5] But with all the identity there is a perplexing difference; and this we consider at once.

It is the incomplete effect of the Agent. This is a very essential part of his definition of the Species, but one which Bacon found it difficult to make clear.[6] If, as we have seen, the Species is virtually the Agent, then apparently every Agent will be constantly reproducing its very self. In consequence, all things would be changed into each other; and in the end the “higher” things would replace all others.[7] But things in the world about us show that very few of them reproduce themselves in complete effects. In fact, the higher a thing stands in the scale of being, the less complete is the Species which it produces.[8]

To meet this difficulty our Philosopher finds it characteristic of the Species, that so long as it remains Species its being is an incomplete one, and when it becomes complete it is simply no longer Species, but the complete Effect.[9] For, the only complete Effect is the Patient-made-Agent, the Effect found after the operation of the Species; and as opposed to this the Species has not complete being, but is “mere species.”[10] That is, it doesn't exist for itself at all, but only for the assimilation of the Patient to the Agent;[11] it is the first effect and produces the complete Effect, but for just this reason it cannot be itself complete.[12] And so one must say, it is really the

  1. II—530, cf. C. N. 24.
  2. See I—120, cf. C. N. 45.
  3. See II—411.
  4. Ibid. Cf. 435.
  5. For this remarkable conclusion, see II—431.
  6. His use of the word is ambiguous; (a) as wanting in the total number of parts in a whole (here applicable to Effect), (b) as wanting in the full character of that which it represents (here Species and Effect).
  7. See II—453.
  8. See II—413ff., cf. 455ff., C. N. 19, Br. 109. Only the four elementary substances (especially fire) can complete their Species. The four corresponding touch-qualities and light, also can, but color, taste, sound and smell cannot. Cf. infra.
  9. See II—414, 419, 519, cf. 413, 416, 424, 503.
  10. For "sola species" contrasted with "effectus completus," see II—519, 546, 453, 446, 451 and 57.
  11. See C. N. 20.
  12. Cf. infra, "first effect."