of the Species[1]—save one, and that is by eduction from the Matter of the Patient. This is the theory to which Bacon adheres, in reality the Aristotelian notion, and which he seeks to explain. And at this point he means to make an advance beyond Aristotle. Let us see just what he has in mind.
The Education Theory—Having said that immediacy must be taken as ultimate, Bacon can say only, that the Agent comes in contact with the Patient and forthwith is produced the effect of the Agent’s “virtue”—for that is what this virtue means, the capacity for effecting something. Therefore, in the problem concerning the genesis of the Species, the production as such must remain a mystery. And the only question in point in this: Whence is the Species generated?—and “whence” in its definite spatial sense.[2] And Bacon’s reply is, that there is only one possible “whence,” and that is the Patient itself.[3]
This is obvious from the fact, that the species is identical with the Effect, and to produce the one is to produce the other;[4] but the Effect has the dimensions of that in which it is generated, that is to say the Patient, hence the same must be said with reference to the species, which is the incomplete effect “on its way” to the complete effect.[5] Thus, the species is not put into the receptive potentiality of the matter of the Patient from without, but it comes from[6] the active potentiality of the Patient itself.[7]
But just what is this active potentiality of the Matter of the Patient? We can understand it best in its historical setting, since Bacon means to follow Aristotle in his conception of eduction. For Aristotle[8] there is a twofold notion of Matter. First, of Matter as such, absolute and without Form; second, of Matter as that which with Form constitutes any substance. The former is the “first” or ultimate foundation, which is common to all changing bodies; in itself merely the “indefinite,” it is determined through pure Form.[9] The latter is that original corporeal element from which anything arises; it is the Matter of any given Composite in which the Form may change. This is the Matter of which Aristotle usually speaks. Now in this Matter[10] (as well as in Form) is the ground for the manifold variety of the world about us; for it is merely potential and may become anything. But not everything can
- ↑ See II—433, cf. 437.
- ↑ See II—450, cf. 57, I—III. 138, Br. 120.
- ↑ So Aristotle; see Zeller, ibid. 355, 356.
- ↑ See II—433, cf. 436.
- ↑ See II—503.
- ↑ Bacon's expression is "de potentia," v., e.g. II—433, 436, 437, 458, 503, 508, 509. He also uses "ex potentia," e.g. Br. 230.
- ↑ See II—433.
- ↑ Cf. Baeumker: D. Prob. d. Mat. etc. pp. 240ff.
- ↑ It is of course neither corporeal nor substantial; the conception is dynamic, not spatial. And thus broadly defined, but never systematically employed, by Aristotle, it became the basis for the Scholastic notion of primary Matter.
- ↑ Cf. Baeumker, ibid. 281ff.; Zeller, ibid. 407ff.
