cité électorale, ni de mettre ce signe hors de l'atteinte des vicissitudes de la société.”[1]
It would be necessary to fix the numbers of the population, or the rated value of property, or some other measure, on attaining which any borough or local division should be entitled to elect a representative, if such election were to add an additional member to the representative body; but when, under the operation of another rule, the aggregate number of members can never be exceeded, and the relative and proportionate weight of every constituency is preserved, whatever may be its mutations, the constitution is relieved from the necessity of prescribing any measure, whether of number, or value, or other denomination. It may then be left wholly to the option of any body of electors proposing to form themselves into a separate constituency, and having reasonable grounds for doing so, to take proceedings for that purpose. The application for the privilege would be some evidence that the constituency deserved it; for nothing would be gained but the power of bemg represented in their corporate character by some man chosen by the majority, and between whom and the electoral body the connection of member and constituent may be a source of mutual gratification.
With our present experience of the apathy which is commonly manifested in political matters by great multitudes of the most intelligent classes—especially in their own particular districts—it is difficult to realise the expansion of individual energy and corporate spirit which a free political system would be likely to call forth; or to estimate the amount of the beneficial influence it would be calculated to exercise both on the character of the electors and the elected. It would bring out in all its force that spirit of zealous endeavour, honourable emulation, and just pride, which both creates majorities and renders them beneficial to society. Instead of extinguishing all but themselves, they stimulate the exertions
- ↑ Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., pp. 236, 237
