Page:Thomas Hare - The Election of Representatives, parliamentary and municipal.djvu/137

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THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
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source of all this activity is known only to two or three, or at most a few of the initiated, who convert other men into their unconscious tools. "The corrupt lead the blind, and the blind lead one another." The candidate is instructed in what he should say, and more perfectly still in what he must not say. The proper insignia of party, whether liberal or conservative, the popular shibboleth, are settled and made the most of; and, unless the candidate be encountered by an adversary with more funds or better tactics, he embarks with every chance of success. In a general scramble for votes, with no trusted leader, it is not surprising that the most canning and the most impudent should gather the greatest share.<ref>"Better the Whartons and Delavals," is indignantly said, "than mediocrity and meanness returned by jobbery and machinery." Id., p. 42. The description given by an American writer of the arts of electioneering practised under their institutions, and quoted by Mr. Tremenheere (Constitution of the United States, p. 130), shows that they are of an analogous kind under similar circumstances.

If, it may be asked, any of the electors, especially the more intelligent, be not satisfied with the candidates who have presented themselves, why do they not bring forward others ? Why do they suffer themselves to be led or cajoled by a section or clique ? To this question there are many answers: first, the machinery by which the candidates have been placed where they are, has been carefully concealed. The foul play may be selected, but it is not known, and cannot be proved. Secondly, it is well known, that when the ground is once occupied, all attempts to introduce other candidates are nearly hopeless, and, if made, are sure to cover him who makes them with obloquy. He is branded as a traitor to the cause of his party. He is told that it will divide the interest, and let in an opponent. It is clear, in fact, that every additional candidate—every step which would thus appear to afford a wider field for the choice of the electors—actually tends to defeat its own purpose, and more