electors, 'Here is a man you desire to elect, but there is a law which restrains you from so doing'" Lord Grey has also pointed out the advantage of having in Parliament the aid of men engaged in official life.[1]
It can scarcely admit of doubt, that, on principle, no person should be excluded from the House of Commons on the ground of any official employment, unless there be an absolute incompatibility between the respective duties—as, for example, it would be impossible that a clerk of the House should be at the same time a member, from the impossibihty of one man being at the same time both master and servant. The judges of the common law are said to be excluded because they sit in the Lords' house; which does not apply to the judges in Chancery. It is a mistake to reason upon the fact of a judicial officer having in his personal capacity a seat in the legislature, in which he only takes a part with many others, as if it were open to the objection of combining and confusing the legislative and judicial power. The person may officiate in both capacities without any blending of the power. Lord Eldon would at all times have felt as clearly his duties in the House of Lords as in the Court of Chancery, and never could have confounded one with the other. The administration of the laws affecting public liberty may distinguish the position of the judges of the superior courts from all other persons, but the distinction is by no means clear.[2]
A general and uniform principle should be adopted as to every pubUc officer not excluded by evident and strong necessity. If, after the possession of office had been declared and known, a numerous and free constituency choose him as their representative, there ceases to be any foundation on public grounds for the policy which would exclude him. Nothing but the absolute inconsistency of the several duties should be
