to test the comparative merits of the method of appropriation which has been ultimately adopted, and which is now proposed, as a rule not only superior to any other method which has yet been suggested, but possessing every quality that is practically needful.
1. The elimination of the candidates having less of public support, may commence with the candidate having the smallest number of votes actual or contingent,—or, in other words, the candidate whose name is mentioned on the smallest number of voting papers, whether at their head or in any other position upon them; and this being ascertained, by cancelling the name of such candidate throughout the voting papers; then that of the next candidate in like circumstances, and so on until only so many are left as shall complete the House.
This process gives an undue weight to mere aggregate numbers,—or to the multitude as compared with the few,—a preponderance which is the great danger of popular government. This effect is immediately seen when it is considered, that, by counting every name on every voting paper for the purpose of determining which candidate is the least popular that the elimination may begin by excluding him,—the effect of each paper is multiplied in the ratio of the number of names which it contains, and thereby a multiplied force is given to the combinations of large bodies of voters, or of parties, which would enable them, by the use of prepared or printed lists of candidates, to overpower the deliberate voices of the less numerous classes, and the more thoughtful electors. Although the party nominees could not be elected until their votes severally reached the quota, or placed them at the head of the poll, their success would indirectly, and scarcely less effectually, be promoted by the cancellation of the names of other candidates who were put forward by smaller numbers of voters, and who were, therefore, the first to be excluded.
2. Instead of computing the number of repetitions of each
