droit dérivé de la simple qualité d'homme."[1] It may be assumed that in any law regulating the suffrage, to the extent in which it is given, it will be founded on the supposition of capacity; and to the extent to which it is restricted, it will be restricted on the supposition of incapacity. Any statesman who shall attempt to carry an electoral law on a narrower basis than this—even if any party combinations should give him a temporary success,—will most assuredly prepare the way for future political difficulties. If a standard of capacity be once adopted—whatever be its elements—the next question for the consideration of statesmen in this country is,—whether any ground exists for disturbing this general standard of capacity by exceptional privileges or restrictions dependent on the place in which the individual elector resides? It is only in a social condition which is become highly artificial that such a question could be seriously proposed. No one will gravely argue that the residents of one district of the United Kingdom, when subjected to the same tests, are so inferior in capacity or character to those who reside in another district, that a different and exceptional standard of electoral capacity should be adopted. No reasons for such a difference, founded on intellect, opinion, disposition, or any other conceivable quality, are applicable to the people of these islands within any specific geographical or other line. The same general standard applies to the Englishman in Cornwall and in Cornhill. None will probably deny that in scientific acumen and courageous enterprise the county may fearlessly sustain a comparison with the city.
Those who would refuse to the inhabitants of the country districts their equal title to electoral power, will, when subjected to close scrutiny, be found to be a class of small weight or influence. The remarks of a leader of the reformers on this subject are significant. He observed:—"I know no good reason why the franchise in counties should
- ↑ Gouv. Rep., vol. i., p. 110.
