what is to be abolished, and what retained. We have a guiding star for the work of reformation.”[1]
In considering the process of interesting greater numbers in the constitution by investing them with political rights, we meet with the fact that the proportionate interest felt by the constituency appears to diminish as the numbers of the constituency increase. It is found that in the larger constituencies about fifty-five per cent, and in the smaller ones about ninety-two per cent., of the electors recorded their votes on the occasion of contests at the same general election.[2] This divergence from representation is still more apparent when the active elements,—the fifty-five per cent.,—are further reduced by taking from them the minority,—the voice of which is extinguished, and which consists of about two-thirds,—leaving the numbers actually represented in the larger constituency as about thirty-three per cent. The unrepresented portion is not only great in numbers; but there is no doubt that in many populous boroughs it also contains the largest portion of the educated classes, of those to which, in every view of representative institutions, it is desirable that full weight should be given. It is therefore of paramount importance to discover, and if possible remove, the causes which tend practically to exclude from representation so extensive and valuable a part of the electoral element; and this is now of especial urgency, as every step in the extension of political privileges, whilst it has the effect of changing the class in which power resides, increases at the same time the disturbing causes that interfere with and are evidently obstacles to true representation.
A perfect representation is plainly inconsistent with the exclusion of minorities; but the subject of representation would be very inadequately conceived, if it were regarded as a mere question between majorities and minorities. The formation of electoral majorities and minorities is no more the
