Per Curiam
skills… that became manifest before age 18,” 536 U. S., at 318, Atkins did not definitively resolve how that element was to be evaluated but instead left its application in the first instance to the States. Id., at 317.
Moreover, the posture in which Moore reached this Court (it did not arise under AEDPA) and the Moore majority’s primary reliance on medical literature that postdated the Ohio courts’ decisions, 581 U. S., at ___, ___, provide additional reasons to question the Court of Appeals’ analysis. Cf. Cain v. Chappell, 870 F. 3d 1003, 1024, n. 9 (CA9 2017) (because “Moore is not an AEDPA case” and was “decided just this spring,” “Moore itself cannot serve as ‘clearly established’ law at the time the state court decided Cain’s claim”).
IV
The centrality of Moore in the Court of Appeals’ analysis is reflected in the way in which the intellectual-disability issue was litigated below. The Atkins portion of Hill’s habeas petition did not focus on §2254(d)(1), the provision on which the decision below is based.[1] Instead, it began and ended with appeals to a different provision of the habeas statute, §2254(d)(2), which supports relief based on a state court’s “unreasonable determination of the facts.” In particular, Hill opened with the claim that the Ohio courts’ findings on “adaptive functioning” “were an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence,” Amended Pet. for Habeas Corpus in No. 96–CV–795 (ND
- ↑ While Hill’s petition argued at one point that certain unidentified “procedures” used by the state courts in making the relevant decisions “violated clearly established federal law of Ford/Panetti/Atkins,” Amended Pet. for Habeas Corpus in No. 96–CV–795 (ND Ohio) (Doc. 94), p. 15, ¶45, the petition plainly did not encompass his current argument that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established law under Atkins by overemphasizing adaptive strengths and improperly considering his prison behavior.
