Mr. H. T. Coreprooxe on the Philosophy of the Hindus. 95
Gotama enumerates sixteen heads or topics: among which, proof or
evidence, and that which is to be proven, are chief; and the rest are sub-
sidiary or accessory, as contributing to knowledge and ascertainment of
truth. Disputation being contemplated in this arrangement, several among
these heads relate to controversial discussion. ‘They are, 1st. proof; 2d.
that which is to be known and proven; 3d. doubt; 4th. motive; 5th. in-
stance ; 6th. demonstrated truth; 7th. member of a regular argument or
syllogism ; 8th. reasoning by reduction to absurdity ; 9th. determination or
ascertainment ; 10th. thesis or disquisition; 11th. controversy ; 12th. ob-
jection; 13th. fallacious reason; 14th. perversion; 15th. futility; 16th.
confutation.*
The difference between these two arrangements is not considered to amount to discrepancy. ‘They are held to be reconcileable : the one more ample, the other more succinct ; but both leading to like results.
The Sanc’hya philosophy, as shewn in a former essay, affirms two eternal principles, soul and matter ; (for pracriti or nature, abstracted from modifi- cations, is no other than matter :) and reckoning, with these two permanent principles, such as are transient, they enumerate twenty-five.
The Nyaya, as well as the Sdnc’hya, concur with other schools of psy- chology, in promising beatitude, or (nihsréyas) final excellence, and (mécsha) deliverance from evil, for the reward of a thorough knowledge of the prin- ciples which they teach; that is, of truth; meaning the conviction of the soul’s eternal existence separable from body.
Soul then, as the Bhdshya affirms, is that which is to be known and proven. Gdrama, however, enumerates under this head, besides soul, its associate body, the external senses, things or the objects of sense, (that is, the elements, and his followers here take occasion to introduce CanApp’s six categories), intellect or understanding, mind or the eternal organ, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit or consequence of deeds, pain or physical evil, and lastly, liberation; making, together with soul, twelve (praméya) objects of proof, being topics of knowledge requisite for de- liverance.
I. Evidence or proof (pramina) by which those objects are known and demonstrated, is of four kinds: perception ; inference of three sorts, (con-
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