able to oontroul them in their most furious movements.
What makes this whole affair more uncertain, is, that a
calm passion may easily be chang'd into a violent one, either
by a change of temper, or of the circumstances and situation
of the object, as by the borrowing of force from any attendant
passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination. Upon
the whole, this struggle of passion and of reason, as it is
call'd, diversifies human life, and makes men so different not
only from each other, but also from themselves in different
times. Philosophy can only account for a few of the greater
and more sensible events of this war; but must leave all the
smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent on
principles too line and minute for her comprehension.
SECTION IX.
Of the direct passions.
'Tis easy to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of any kind, 'tis only requisite to present some good or evil. Upon the removal of pain and pleasure there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred, pride and humility, desire and aversion, and of most of our reflective or secondary impressions.
The impressions, which arise from good and evil most naturally, and with the least preparation are the dared passions of desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, along with volition. The mind by an original instinct tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil, tho' they be conceiv'd merely in idea, and be consider'd as to exist in any future period of time.
But supposing that there is an immediate impression of pain or pleasure, and that arising from an object related to ourselves or others, this does not prevent the propensity or aversion, with the consequent emotions, but by concurring
