Thus upon the whole, 'tis impossible, that the distinction betwixt moral good and evil, can be made by reason; since that distinction has an influence upon our actions, of which reason alone is incapable. Reason and judgment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or by directing a passion: But it is not pretended, that a judgment of this kind, either in its truth or falshood, is attended with virtue or vice. And as to the judgments, which are
For the same reason, a thief, who steals in by a ladder at a window, and takes all imaginable care to cause no disturbance, is in no respect criminal. For either he will not be perceiv'd, or if he be, 'tis impossible he can produce any error, nor will any one, from these circumstances, take him to be other than what he really is.
'Tis well known, that those who are squint-sighted, do very readily
cause mistakes in others, and that we imagine they salute or are talking
to one person, while they address themselves to another. Are they
therefore, upon that account, immoral?
Besides, we may easily observe, that in all those arguments there is
an evident reasoning in a circle. A person who takes possession of
another's goods, and uses them as his own, in a manner declares them to be his own; and this falshood is the source of the immorality of injustice. But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without an antecedent morality?
A man that is ungrateful to his benefactor, in a manner affirms, that
he never received any favours from him. But in what manner? Is it
because 'tis his duty to be grateful? But this supposes, that there is
some antecedent rule of duty and morals. Is it because human nature
is generally grateful, and makes us conclude, that a man who does any
harm never received any favour from the person he harm'd? But
human nature is not so generally grateful, as to justify such a conclusion. Or if it were, is an exception to a general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason than because it is an exception?
But what may suffice entirely to destroy this whimsical system is, that
it leaves us under the same difficulty to give a reason why truth is
virtuous and falshood vicious, as to account for the merit or tarpitude
of any other action. I shall allow, if you please, that all immorality is
derived from this supposed falsehood in action, provided you can give
me any plausible reason, why such a falshood is immoral. If you
consider rightly of the matter, you will find yourself in the same
difficulty as at the beginning.
This last argument is very conclusive; because, if there be not an
evident merit or turpitude annex'd to this species of truth or falshood, it can never have any influence upon our actions. For, who ever thought
of forbearing any action, because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it? Or, who ever perform'd any, that he might give rise
to true conclusions?
