504
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE.
of; and this is the reason, why they wou'd so naturally agree in preferring it.[1]
- ↑ No questions in philosophy are more difficult, than when a number
of causes present themselves for the same phænomenon, to determine
which is the principal and predominant. There seldom is any very
precise argument to fix our choice, and men must be contented to be
guided by a kind of taste or fancy, arising from analogy, and a comparison
of similar instances. Thus, in the present case, there are, no
doubt, motives of public interest for most of the rules, which determine
property; but still I suspect, that these rules are principally fix'd by the imagination, or the more frivolous properties of our ought and conception. I shall continue to explain these causes, leaving it to the
reader's choice, whether he will prefer those deliv'd from pubick utility,
or those deriv'd from the imagination. We shall begin with the right
of the present possessor.
'Tis a quality, which ((a) Book I. Part IV. sect. 5.) I have already observ'd in human nature, that when two objects appear in a close relation to each other, the mind is apt to ascribe to them any additional relation, in order to compleat the union; and this inclination is so strong, as often to make us run into errors (such as that of the conjunction of thought and matter) if we find that they can serve to that purpose. Many of our impressions are incapable of place or local position; and yet those very impressions we suppose to have a local conjunction with the impressions of sight and touch, merely because they are conjoin'd by causation, and are already united in the imagination. Since, therefore, we can feign a new relation, and even an absurd one, in order to compleat any union, 'twill easily be imagin'd, that if there be any relations, which depend on the mind, 'twill readily conjoin them to any preceding relation, and unite, by a new bond, such objects as have already an union in the fancy. Thus for instance, we never fail, in our arrangement of bodies, to place those which are resembling in continuity to each other, or at least in correspondent points of view; because we feel a satisfaction in joining the relation of contiguity to that of resemblance, or the resemblance of situation to that of qualities. And this is easily accounted for from the known properties o human nature. When the mind is determin'd to join certain objects, but undetermin'd in its choice of the particular objects, it naturally turns its eye to such as are related together. They are already united in the mind: They present themselves at the same time to the conception; and instead of requiring any new reason for their conjunction, it wou'd require a very powerful reason to make us over-look this natural amnity. This we shall have occasion to explain more fully afterwards, when we come to treat of beauty. In the mean time, we may content ourselves with observing, that the same love of order and uniformity, which arranges the books in a library, and the chairs in a parlour, contribute to the formation of society, and to the well-being of mankind, by modifying the general rule concerning the stability of possession. And as property forms a relation betwixt a person and an object, 'tis natural to found it on some preceding relation; and as property is nothing but a constant possession, secur'd by the laws
