The right of succession is a very natural one, from the presum'd consent of the parent or near relation, and from the general interest of mankind, which requires, that men's possessions shou'd pass to those, who are dearest to them, in
Rhenish, Burgundy and Port; and suppose they shou'd fall a quarrelling about the division of them; a person, who was chosen for umpire, wou'd naturally, to shew his impartiality, give every one the product of his own country: And this from a principle, which, in some measure, is the source of those laws of nature, that ascribe property to occupation, prescription and accession.
In all these cases, and particularly that of accession, there is first a
natural union betwixt the idea of the person and that of the object, and
afterward a new and moral union produc'd by that right or property,
which we ascribe to the person. But here there occurs a difficulty,
which merits our attention, and may afford us an opportunity of putting
to tryal that singular method of reasoning, which has been employ'd on
the present subject. I have already observ'd, that the imagination
passes with greater facility from little to great, than from great to little, and that the transition of ideas is always easier and smoother in the former use than in the latter. Now as the right of accession arises
from the easy transition of ideas, by which relates objects are connected
together, it shou'd naturally be imagin'd, that the right of accession
must encrease in strength, in proportion as the transition of ideas is perform'd with greater facility. It may, therefore, be thought, that when
we have acquir'd the property of any small object, we shall readily
consider any great object related to it as an accession, and as belonging
to the proprietor of the small one; hence the transition is in that case
very easy from the small object to the great one, and shou'd connect
them together in the closest manner. But in fact the case is always
found to be otherwise. The empire of Great Britain seems to draw
along with it the dominion of the Orkneys, the Hebrides, the isle of Man, and the isle of Wight; but the authority over those lesser islands does not naturally imply any title to Great Britain. In short, a small object naturally follows a great one as its accession; but a great one is never suppos'd to belong to the proprietor of a small one related to it, merely on account of that property and relation. Yet in this latter case the transition of ideas is smoother from the proprietor to the small object, which is his property, and from the small object to the great one, than in the former case from the proprietor to the great object, and from the great one to the small. It may therefore be thought, that these phænomena are objections to the foregoing hypothesis, that the ascribing of property to accession it nothing but an effect of the relations of ideas, and of the smooth transition of the imagination.
'Twill be easy to solve this objection, if we consider the agility and
unsteadiness of the imagination, with the different views, in which it is
continually placing its objects. When we attribute to a person a
property in two objects, we do not always pass from the person to one
object, and from that to the other related to it. The objects being here
to be consider`d as the property of the person, we are apt to join them
