person on those who have any intercourse with him which causes our moral sentiments, 582; it is almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any considerable article, 608 (v. Identity, § 4).
Chastity—and modesty, 570 f.; their obligation extended by general rules, 573; less obligation to male chastity because less interest, 573.
Choice—'will or choice,' 467.
Civil—opposed to 'natural,' 475 n, 543.
Clarke—on cause, 80.
Cleanliness—611.
Coherence—of our sensations a source of the fiction of their continued existence, 195 f.; =the regular dependence of the changes of our perceptions on one another, 195; of pleasures 'of a somewhat different kind' to that of other impressions, 195; does not lead us to attribute continued existence to our passions, but only to such perceptions as motion, solidity, figure, &c.; we cannot explain the regularity of certain of our perceptions without imagining their continued existence, 196-7; this coherence works through custom, but 'indirectly and obliquely'—i.e. by exciting the propensity of the imagination to continue in the path in which it is travelling and to complete the observed partial uniformity into a complete uniformity, 198 (cf. 237); an irregular kind of reasoning from experience, e.g. coherence enables us to discover relations between objects as opposed to perceptions, 242.
Common—natural, 549.
Comparison—the function of reasoning, 73; men always judge objects more by comparison than from their intrinsic worth or value, 372-5; must be with members of the same species, 378; illustration from history and arts, 379; directly contrary to sympathy in its operation, 593; sympathy requires greater vivacity in the idea than suffices for comparison, 595.
Composite nature of all bodies, 219.
Conception—all acts of understanding, whether reasoning, judgment, or belief, resolvable into conception, 97 n; always precedes and conditions understanding, 164; conception of an object distinguished from belief in its existence only by the greater firmness of the latter, 624, 627.
Conquest—a title to government, 558.
Conscience—or 'a sense of morals,' is 'an active principle of which Reason can never be the cause,' 458; (v. Moral, § 1).
Consent—not the basis of government (q.v.), 542 f.; dwelling in its dominion: not consent to a government, 549.
Constancy—of our impressions a source of the fiction of their continued existence, and afterwards of their distinct existence, 199 f.; constancy of impressions=their resemblance at different times, 199; this resemblance leads us to mistake a succession of related
