itself with the good and to avoid the evil, 438; direct passions often arise from an unaccountable instinct, 439.
Intention, 348, 349, 413, 461 and n.
Interest (v. Justice)—sentiments from interest and morals apt to be confounded, 473; imposes a natural as opposed to a moral obligation, 498, 546; and promises (q.v.), 519 f.; the source of the three fundamental 'laws of nature,' 526; and allegiance (v. Government), 537 f,; and chastity, 573.
Internal—opposed to external (q.v.), 464, 478 (v. Body, Identity).
Intuition—a source of knowledge and certainty, perceiving three out of four demonstrable relations, viz., resemblance, contrariety, and degree in any quality, 70; does not inform us of necessity of a cause to a beginning of existence, 79.
Joy—and pride, 190; a mixture of, with grief produces hope and fear, 441 f.
Judgment.
§ 1. Does not necessarily imply union of two ideas, 96 n: only a form of conception, 'we can form a proposition which contains only one idea,' 97 n; judgments are 'perceptions,' 456; only judgments can be unreasonable, not passions or actions, 416, 459; morality more properly felt than judged of, 470; our judgments less voluntary than our actions, 609.
§ 2. The object of the judgment a system of realities, 108; confusion between judgment and sensation in vision, 112; opposed to imagination, as employing general rules to distinguish essential from accidental circumstances in an antecedent, 147-149; and understanding provide a natural remedy for the selfishness of men by altering the direction of the passions, 489, 493; as contrasted with memory has merit or demerit.
Justice.
§ 1. Produces pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, 477; the motive to acts of justice cannot be regard to their justice, 477-480; nor can it be concern for our private interest or reputation, since pure self-love is the source of all injustice, 480; nor regard to public interest, 481, 495; for there is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind merely as such, 482; nor private benevolence, or regard to the interests of the party concerned, 482; 'hence we must allow that the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, though necessarily, from education and human conventions, 483 (cf. 530); artificial, but not therefore arbitrary: its rules are the result of the 'intervention of thought and conception,' which however is so obvious and necessary that it is really quite as natural as anything else, 484; its rules may be called 'Laws of Nature,' if
