Liveliness—of impressions, 98 f., 119; vagueness of term, 105 (v. idea).
Locke—his misuse of word 'idea,' 2; cited, 35; argument to prove necessity of a cause, 81; on idea of power, 157.
Logic—rules of, 175.
Love.
§ 1. And hatred, 329 f.; explained in same way as pride (q.v.) and humility; their object is 'some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious,' 229 (cf. 482); 'some person or thinking being,' 331; experiment to confirm this, 332; transition from love to pride easier than that from pride to love, 339.
§ 2. Difficulties in this theory, 347 f.; we do not love or hate a man unless either the quality in him which pleases or displeases us be constant and inherent in him, or unless he does it from design which points to certain permanent qualities in him which remain after the action is performed, 348 (cf. 609); the man's design affects us by sympathy with his esteem or hatred of us, 349; we love relations and acquaintance apart from any direct pleasure they afford us, 352; because our connexion with them is always giving us new lively ideas by sympathy, and every lively idea is pleasant, 353; sympathy with others is agreeable 'only by giving an emotion to the spirits, 354.
§ 3. Always attended with a desire, which distinguishes it from pride, which is a pure emotion in the soul, 367; its conjunction with a desire is arbitrary, original, and instinctive, 368.
§ 4. Between the sexes, derived from the conjunction of three different impressions or passions, 394; produces the first rudiments of society, 486.
§ 5. Self-love not love in proper sense, 329; self-love the source of all injustice, 480; 'no such passion in human minds as love of mankind merely as such,' 481; 'man in general' or human nature the object but not the cause of love, 482; a social passion, 491; dejects the soul like humility, 391; love and hatred of animals, 397; love of truth, 448 f.
§ 6. Virtue-power of our mental qualities to produce pride and love, 575; why the same qualities in all cases produce both pride and love, humility and hatred, 589; we praise all passions which partake of love, e.g. benevolence, because love is immediately agreeable to the person actuated by it, 604; and because the transition from love to love is peculiarly easy, 605; praise and blame a fainter love and hatred, 614; love and esteem, 608 n.
Loyalty—rigid, akin to superstition, 562.
Malbranohe—on power, 158, 249.
Malesieu, 30.
Malice—and envy, 371 f.; is pity reversed: the misery of others gives
