in any considerable article,' 608; the intellectual world has no such contradictions as the natural: 'what is known concerning it agrees with itself, and what is unknown we must be content to leave so,' 232; 'the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known,' 366 (cf. 175).
§ 2. A. Its immateriality, 232-250; we have no idea of the substance of the mind because no impression, 232; if substance means something which can exist by itself, then perceptions are substances, 233: nor have we any idea of inhesion, 234; the question concerning the substance of the mind is absolutely unintelligible, 250.
B. Its local conjunction with matter: it is argued that thought and extension are wholly incompatible and therefore the soul must be immaterial, 234; now it is true that the greater part of beings exist and yet are nowhere, viz. all objects and perceptions except those of sight and touch, 335, and others to which imagination gives local position, 237; hence the materialists wrong who conjoin all thought with extension (q.v.), 239; yet there are impressions and ideas really extended, 240; the doctrine of the immateriality, indivisibility, and simplicity of a thinking substance is a true atheism and will justify all Spinoza's infamous opinions, 241; Spinoza says the universe of objects is a modification of a simple subject, theologians that the universe of thought is a modification of a simple substance, 242; both views unintelligible and equally absurd, 245-4, and result in a dangerous and irrecoverable atheism, 244; it is just the same if you call thought an action instead of a modification of the soul, 245, 246; the cause of our perceptions may be and is matter (q.v.) and motion, 247-8.
Miraculous—opposed to 'natural,' 474.
Miser—illustration from, 314.
Modes—a kind of complex ideas produced by association, 13; and substances, 17; Spinoza's theory of modes or modifications compared with that of the 'theologians,' 242-4 (v. Mind, § 2 B).
Modesty, 570 f.
Monarchy—originates in war, not in patriarchal government, 541.
Moral.
§ 1. Moral distinctions not derived from reason, 455 f.; 'is morality like truth discerned merely by ideas and by their juxtaposition and comparison?' is virtue conformity to reason, 456; (a) 'since morals have an influence on the actions and affections it follows they cannot be derived from reason,' 457, because reason is wholly inactive and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience or a sense of morals, 458 (cf. 415 f.); (b) since passions, volitions and actions are 'original facts and realities complete in themselves, they cannot be either true or false, contrary or conformable to reason,
