guished from the quality which operates, the two together forming the cause, 279, 285 (v. Pride).
Substance.
§ 1. A. Substances, a class of complex ideas produced by association, 13; idea of substance, a collection of simple ideas, united by imagination, which have a common name assigned to them, 16.
B. Fiction of, to support; the supposed simplicity and identity of bodies, 219 f.; 'an unintelligible chimaera,' 222; peripatetic distinction of substance and substantial form, 221; the whole system incomprehensible, 222; no impression from which the idea of it can be derived, 232 (cf. 633); definition of, as 'something which may exist by itself,' 'agrees to everything which can possibly be conceived,' 233.
§ 2. Of the soul, 232 f.; (v. Mind), 'the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible,' 250; impossible to conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance, just as it is to conjoin all thought with extension, 239; 'the doctrine of immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism,' and is the same as Spinoza's doctrine of the unity of substance in which both thought and matter inhere, 240 f.; theory of mode and substance of Spinoza and theologians compared, 243-4; are self and substance the same? 635.
Success makes us take pleasure in ends which originally were not pleasant, 451.
Succession.
§ 1. Independent of and antecedent to the operations of the understanding, 168; confounded with identity, 204, 254 f.; self a succession of perceptions, 277; no satisfactory theory to explain principles that unite our successive impressions in our thought or consciousness, 636 (v. Time, Identity, § 3, 4).
§ 2. And property, 505, 513; and government, 559; aided by imagination, e.g. the claims of Cyrus, 560.
Superstition—and philosophy, 271.
Surprise, 301.
Sympathy.
§ 1. A. (v. Identity, § 4), explained by the conversion of an idea into an impression, 317, 427; the idea or impression of self is always present and lively, 317, 330 (cf. 340); so any object related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, 317; now other people very closely resemble ourselves (cf. 359, 575); so this resemblance makes us easily enter into their sentiments; the relations of contiguity and causation assist, and all together convey the impression or consciousness of one person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, 318, 320; and thus the idea of another's sentiment or passion may be 'so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or
