quality … which the most rigid orthodoxy must allow to belong to will, 410; the will only a cause, and like other causes has no discoverable connexion with its effects: we can never see the connexion of a volition with a motion of the body, still less with an action of the mind, 651; we only perceive the constant conjunction of the actions of the mind as we do of those of matter, 653.
B. Influencing motives of, 413 f.; reason (q.v.) alone can never be any motive to the will: demonstration is concerned with the world of ideas, 'will always places us in that of realities:' probable reasoning only directs a desire or aversion which already exists, 414; reason incapable of preventing volition, 415; reason and passion can never dispute for the government of the will and of actions, 416; calm passions often determine the will in opposition to the violent, 418, 419.
§ 8. Natural abilities not distinguished from moral virtues because involuntary, 608 f.; for (1) most of the virtues are equally involuntary; indeed it is almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any considerable article, 608 (cf. 624); (2) no one will assert that a quality can never produce pleasure or pain to the person who considers it unless it be perfectly voluntary in the person who possesses it, 609 (cf. 548-9); (3) free will has no place with regard to the actions no more than the qualities of men: 'it is not a just consequence that what is voluntary is free;' 'our actions are more voluntary than our judgments, but we have not more liberty in the one than in the other,' 609: belief not an idea, because the mind has the command over all its ideas, 614.
Wit—true, distinguished only by taste, i.e. by resulting pleasure, 297; a quality immediately agreeable to others, and so virtuous, 590; and eloquence, 611.
[Wollaston]—Theory of vice as tendency to cause false judgments, 461 n.
THE END.
