they hoped by these sundry attacks in all directions to effect the recall of any of the forces investing Anking they were disappointed. Instead of bringing reinforcements from Anking, Tsêng preferred to hold his post with his small force and let the siege go on. Tsêng Kuo-ch'üan, who had gone there as commander, successfully beat off the Taipings who came to raise the siege.
Thus the end of 1860 and the first month of the following year found the imperial cause in grave peril. The Taipings had been subjected to a similar danger twelve months before, but the brilliant exploits of the Chungwang had reopened to them some of the regions from which they had been expelled in the slow, steady progress of Tsêng Kuo-fan and his fellows in Hupeh and Kiangsi, besides opening the way into the almost untapped provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien. Through the intervention of foreigners at Shanghai when the Chungwang approached, they had, however, been kept out of that thriving seaport.
While Tsêng was shut up in Keemun the first suggestion of foreign intervention came. In confidence, the proposals of the Russian envoy, Ignatieff, were transmitted from Peking to secure Tsêng's comments. These proposals were that the Russians place at the disposal of the Chinese government a naval force of three or four hundred men to coöperate with the Chinese army in capturing Nanking; also that vessels flying American and Russian flags be used, in coöperation with American and Chinese merchants at Shanghai, in transporting tribute rice to Peking, the usual route by the Grand Canal being subject to interference at the hands of the enemy.
In his reply to the query Tsêng does not directly oppose the plan, but suggests that it is premature to consider such a course when the land forces are so inadequate, and the water forces already exist in practically sufficient
