Opinion of the Court
lawsuit, the plaintiff could recover treble damages and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees. See 18 U. S. C. §2333(a). But the ATA did not explicitly impose liability on anyone who only helped the terrorists carry out the attack or conspired with them. Prior to 2016, some courts accordingly determined that the ATA did not authorize that sort of secondary civil liability. See, e.g., Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F. 3d 82, 97–98 (CA2 2013).
Then, in 2016, Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) to provide for a form of secondary civil liability. 130 Stat. 852. Thus, as the law now stands, those injured by an act of international terrorism can sue the relevant terrorists directly under §2333(a)—or they can sue anyone “who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism” under §2333(d)(2). For such a secondary-liability claim, there is an additional condition: The “act of international terrorism” must have been “committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under [8 U. S. C. §1189] as of the date on which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or authorized.” Ibid. Plaintiffs seeking secondary liability can likewise recover treble damages and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees. See §§2333(a), (d)(2).
The parties here do not dispute that the first three components of §2333(d)(2) have been adequately alleged: The Reina nightclub attack was an “act of international terrorism”; the attack was “committed, planned, or authorized” by ISIS; and ISIS was “designated as a foreign terrorist organization” as of the date of the Reina nightclub attack.
In short, the act generally must be violent, criminal, intended to intimidate or coerce civilians or a government, and occur either primarily outside the United States or transcending national boundaries. See ibid.
