Page:Twitter v. Taamneh.pdf/25

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Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)
19

Opinion of the Court

as plaintiffs contend, that a defendant have given substantial assistance to a transcendent “enterprise” separate from and floating above all the actionable wrongs that constitute it. Rather, a defendant must have aided and abetted (by knowingly providing substantial assistance) another person in the commission of the actionable wrong—here, an act of international terrorism. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §876(b), and Comment d; Halberstam, 705 F. 2d, at 488.

Plaintiffs insist that Halberstam proves the contrary, but their argument misses the gist of that case. To be sure, Linda Hamilton was not on the scene for the burglary of Halberstam’s house and did not lend any specific support to Halberstam’s murder. Ibid. But Hamilton’s assistance to Welch was so intentional and systematic that she assisted each and every burglary committed by Welch; any time that Welch left the house to burglarize, he would have relied on Hamilton’s assistance in laundering the stolen goods and transforming them into usable wealth. See ibid. Thus, Hamilton did aid and abet Welch in burglarizing Halberstam’s home—and, as noted above, killing Halberstam was a foreseeable consequence of that burglary. See ibid.

On the other hand, defendants overstate the nexus that §2333(d)(2) requires between the alleged assistance and the wrongful act. To start, aiding and abetting does not require the defendant to have known “all particulars of the primary actor’s plan.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons §10, Comment c, p. 104 (Tent. Draft No. 3, Apr. 6, 2018). For example, a defendant might be held liable for aiding and abetting the burning of a building if he intentionally helped others break into the building at night and then, unknown to him, the others lit torches to guide them through the dark and accidentally started a fire. See American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Grim, 201 Kan. 340, 345–347, 440 P. 2d 621, 625–626 (1968); Restatement (Second) of Torts §876, Comment d, Illus. 10, at 318. That leads