Opinion of the Court
id., at 908. But, as discussed above, “the knowledge and substantial assistance” components “should be considered relative to one another” as part of a single inquiry designed to capture conscious and culpable conduct. Camp, 948 F. 2d, at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted). The “knowing” part of that inquiry is therefore designed to capture the defendants’ state of mind with respect to their actions and the tortious conduct (even if not always the particular terrorist act), not the same general awareness that defines Halberstam’s second element.
Finally, when applying Halberstam’s six substantiality factors, the Ninth Circuit appears to have regarded the factors as a sequence of disparate, unrelated considerations without a common conceptual core. See 2 F. 4th, at 909–910. That is incorrect. The point of those factors is to help courts capture the essence of aiding and abetting: participation in another’s wrongdoing that is both significant and culpable enough to justify attributing the principal wrongdoing to the aider and abettor. The Ninth Circuit thus erred in focusing (as it did) primarily on the value of defendants’ platforms to ISIS, rather than whether defendants culpably associated themselves with ISIS’ actions. For example, when applying the second factor (the amount and kind of assistance), the Ninth Circuit should have considered that defendants’ platforms and content-sorting algorithms were generally available to the internet-using public. That focus reveals that ISIS’ ability to benefit from these platforms was merely incidental to defendants’ services and general business models; it was not attributable to any culpable conduct of defendants directed toward ISIS. And, when considering the fourth and fifth factors (the defendants’ relationship to ISIS and the defendants’ state of mind), the Ninth Circuit should have given much greater weight to defendants’ arm’s-length relationship with ISIS—which was essentially no different from their relationship
