Page:U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu.pdf/3

Syllabus

not by itself preclude a finding of scienter under the FCA. Even if the phrase is ambiguous, respondents could have learned its correct meaning. Indeed, petitioners argue that the companies received notice that the phrase referred to their discounted prices, comprehended those notices, and then tried to hide their discounted prices.

Second, the companies’ reliance on Safeco’s interpretation of the common-law definitions of “knowing” and “reckless” is misplaced, because Safeco interpreted a different statute with a different mens rea standard. 551 U. S., at 52. In any event, Safeco did not purport to set forth the purely objective safe harbor that respondents invoke. “Nothing in Safeco suggests that [one] should look to facts”—or, here, legal interpretations—“that the defendant neither knew nor had reason to know at the time he acted.” Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 579 U. S. 93, 106.

Finally, respondents contend their conduct is not actionable according to the common law of fraud incorporated by the FCA because common law fraud does not encompass misrepresentations of law. Respondents then posit that their alleged claims were false only because their claims’ falsity turned in part on the meaning of the phrase “usual and customary”—which, they argue, means that their claims would be false only as misrepresentations of law. But that does not follow. Even assuming that the FCA incorporates some version of this rule, respondents did not make a pure misrepresentation of law; they did not say, for example, “this is what ‘usual and customary’ means.’ ” Rather, they made a statement that implied facts about their prices, essentially saying “this is what our ‘usual and customary’ prices are.” Petitioners’ case thus makes out a valid fraud theory even under respondents’ common-law rule. Pp. 11–16.

No. 21–1326, 9 F. 4th 455; No. 22–111, 30 F. 4th 649, vacated and remanded.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.