UNCLASSIFIEDTOP SECRET// //NOFORN
(TS// //NF) The ALEC Station cable stated that bin al-Shibh had "spent extensive time with [KSM]," and "must have heard discussions of other targets." The cable added that "HQS strongly believes that Binalshibh was involved in efforts on behalf of KSM to identify and place operatives in the West." The February 13, 2003, cable concluded:
"We think Binalshibh is uniquely positioned to give us much needed critical information to help us thwart large-scale attacks inside the United States, and we want to do our utmost to get it as soon as possible. Good luck."[1]
(TS// //NF) CIA officers at DETENTION SITE BLUE therefore continued to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh for approximately three additional weeks after this exchange, including sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial holds, attention grasps, abdominal slaps, facial slaps, and walling.[2] Bin al-Shibh did not provide the information sought on "operatives inside the United States" or "large-scale attacks inside the United States."[3]
4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody of a Foreign Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed as "Sir" and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain
(TS// //NF) CIA records indicate that the CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE questioning Ramzi bin al-Shibh were unaware of the intelligence bin al-Shibh had previously provided in foreign government custody, even though and the intelligence from those interrogations had been disseminated by the CIA. On multiple occasions, personnel at the detention site drafted intelligence reports that contained information previously disseminated from interrogations of bin al-Shibh while he was in foreign government custody, under the faulty understanding that bin al-Shibh was providing new information.[4]
- ↑ ALEC 22888 (240845Z FEB 03).
- ↑ See, for example, 10529 (200840Z FEB 03) and 10573 (241143Z FEB 03). For further detail, see the detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III.
- ↑ See detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III for additional information.
- ↑ See, for example, CIA 20817 (describing the foreign government's interrogators' "plan to ask Binalshibh to clarify his statements that Mohamed Atta, Marwan el-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah could not agree on the wisdom of targeting nuclear facilities"); 10568 (231514Z FEB 03); 20817 ; CIA ; CIA .
TOP SECRET// //NOFORN
Page 79 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED
