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(TS// //NF) Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters began reevaluating the use of the waterboard interrogation technique. According to a March 14, 2003, email from an interrogator who was not at DETENTION SITE BLUE, but was reviewing cable traffic, the "[o]verall view seems to be" that the waterboard "is not working in gaining KSM['s] compliance."[1] The deputy chief of the CIA interrogation program responded in agreement, adding that "[a]gainst KSM it has proven ineffective," and that "[t]he potential for physical harm is far greater with the waterboard than with the other techniques, bringing into question the issue of risk vs. gain...." The deputy chief further suggested that the waterboard was counterproductive, stating that "[w]e seem to have lost ground" with KSM since progress made at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and as a result, the CIA should "consider the possibility" that the introduction of the waterboard interrogation technique "may poison the well."[2] The email in which these sentiments were expressed was sent to , the CTC attorney overseeing the interrogation of KSM. Despite these reservations and assessments, the waterboarding of KSM continued for another 10 days.[3]
(TS// //NF) On March 15, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm references in signals intercepts on al-Qa'ida's efforts to obtain "nuclear suitcases."[4] Subsequent signals intercepts and information from a foreign government would later indicate that the nuclear suitcase threat was an orchestrated scam.[5] KSM was waterboarded a second time that day after failing to provide information on operations against the United States or on al-Qa'ida nuclear capabilities.[6] During the waterboarding sessions that day, the application of the interrogation technique further evolved, with the interrogators now using their hands to maintain a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and mouth in an effort to make it impossible for KSM to ingest all the water being poured.[7] At one point, SWIGERT and DUNBAR waited for KSM to talk before pouring water over his mouth.[8]
- ↑ Email from: ; to: ; cc: ; , [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: re Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions –As of 1000 HRS 14 Mar 03; date: March 14, 2003, at 10:44:12 AM.
- ↑ Email from: ; to: ; cc: , , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ; subject: re Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions –As of 1000 HRS 14 Mar 03; date: March 14, 2003, at 10:44:12 AM.
- ↑ See detailed review of these sessions in Volume III.
- ↑ 10831 (151510Z MAR 03); 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); 10849 (161058Z MAR 03); Interview of , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.
- ↑ The original reporting, that al-Qa'ida had purchased nuclear suitcases in Yemen, was later determined to be based on an effort by unknown Yemenis to sell "suitcase weapons" to al-Qa'ida. Al-Qa'ida operatives concluded that the offer was a scam. See 74492 (250843Z JUL 03), disseminated as ; and HEADQUARTERS (092349Z DEC 04).
- ↑ 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); 10831 (151510Z MAR 03)
- ↑ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ; cc: ; subject: Re: Sitrep as of AM 3/15; date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 A.M. Interview of , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. See also interview of , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. The descriptions of the use of the waterboard interrogation technique against KSM were provided by these two on-site medical officers.
- ↑ Interview of , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.
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