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(TS// //NF) While Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel at CIA Headquarters began discussing how CIA officers would interrogate Abu Zubaydah upon his return to DETENTION SITE GREEN. The initial CIA interrogation proposal recommended that the interrogators engage with Abu Zubaydah to get him to provide information, and suggested that a "hard approach," involving foreign government personnel, be taken "only as a last resort."[1] At a meeting about this proposal, CTC Legal, , recommended that a psychologist working on contract in the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS), Grayson SWIGERT, be used by CTC to "provide real-time recommendations to overcome Abu Zubaydah's resistance to interrogation."[2] SWIGERT had come to 's attention through , who worked in OTS. Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters formally proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with him. CIA records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions would lead Abu Zubaydah to develop a sense of "learned helplessness."[3] CIA Headquarters then sent an interrogation team to Country , including SWIGERT, whose initial role was to consult on the psychological aspects of the interrogation.[4]
(TS// //NF) DCI Tenet was provided an update on the Abu Zubaydah interrogation plans on April 12, 2002. The update stated that the CIA team was preparing for Abu Zubaydah's transfer back to DETENTION SITE GREEN, and noted the CIA interrogation team intended to "set the stage" and increase control over Abu Zubaydah.[5] The update stated:
- "Our [CIA] lead interrogator will require Abu Zubaydah to reveal the most sensitive secret he knows we are seeking; if he dissembles or diverts the conversation, the interview will stop and resume at a later time.… In accordance with the strategy, and with concurrence from FBI Headquarters, the two on-site FBI agents will no longer directly participate in the interview/debriefing sessions."[6]
- ↑ Attachment to email from: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; to: ; subject: Interrogation Strategy, Powerpoint on [Abu Zubaydah] Interrogation Strategy, 01 April 2002; date: March 31, 2002.
- ↑ Email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: , April 1,2002, re: POC for [Grayson SWIGERT]– consultant who drafted al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation backgrounder (noting that CTC/LGL would reach out to SWIGERT). According to the email, after the meeting, CTC Legal, , provided SWIGERT's contact information to ALEC Station officers, noting that it was SWIGERT who composed an OTS assessment on al-Qa'ida resistance techniques.
- ↑ On the evening of April 1, 2002, "at the request of CTC/OPS and ALEC" Station, a cable from OTS with a proposed interrogation strategy was sent to Country ( 178955 (012236Z APR 02). The information in this cable was consistent with a subsequent cable, which was coordinated with SWIGERT, that proposed "several environmental modifications to create an atmosphere that enhances the strategic interrogation process." The cable noted, "[t]he deliberate manipulation of the environment is intended to cause psychological disorientation, and reduced psychological wherewithal for the interrogation," as well as "the deliberate establishment of psychological dependence upon the interrogator," and "an increased sense of learned helplessness." (See [REDACTED] 69500 (070009Z APR 02).) For detailed information, see Volume I and the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
- ↑ DIRECTOR APR 02)
- ↑ CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630 Hours."
- ↑ CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630 Hours."
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