Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/60

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UNCLASSIFIED

methods of interrogation and the resistance techniques employed as countermeasures to such interrogation."[1]

(TS// //NF) According to the CIA cable describing the meeting, the representatives from the OLC, including Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, advised that the criminal prohibition on torture would not prohibit the methods proposed by the interrogation team because of the absence of any specific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.[2] On July 13, 2002, Yoo sent an unclassified letter to the CIA's acting general counsel describing his interpretation of the statute.[3]

(TS// //NF) Despite the initial view expressed by Yoo that the use of the proposed CIA interrogation techniques would be lawful, on July 17, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice requested a delay in the approval of the interrogation techniques for Abu Zubaydah's interrogation until the attorney general issued an opinion.[4] The following day. Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley requested that the Department of Justice "delay the approval of the memo detailing the next phase of interrogations" until the CIA provided specific details on its proposed interrogation techniques and "an explanation of why the CIA is confident these techniques will not cause lasting and irreparable harm to Abu Zubaydah."[5] Rice asked the CIA to provide the OLC with a description of each of the planned interrogation techniques, and to "gather and provide any available empirical data on the reactions and likelihood of prolonged mental harm from the use of the 'water board' and the staged burial."[6]

(TS// //NF) On July 15, 2002, a cable providing details on the proposed interrogation phase stated that only the DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base would be allowed to interrupt or stop an interrogation in process, and that the chief of Base would be the final decision-making authority as to whether the CIA's interrogation techniques applied to Abu Zubaydah would be discontinued.[7] The CIA officers at the detention site added:

"If [Abu Zubaydah] develops a serious medical condition which may involve a host of conditions including a heart attack or another catastrophic type of condition, all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be provided to [him]. In the event [Abu Zubaydah] dies, we need to be prepared to act accordingly, keeping in mind the liaison equities involving our hosts."[8]

  1. DIRECTOR   (031357Z AUG 02)
  2. DIRECTOR   (031357Z AUG 02)
  3. July 13, 2002, Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA.
  4. Memorandumf or the Record from John H. Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 17, 2002.
  5. July 19, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and   Raid  .
  6. July 21, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and   Raid  .
  7.   10536 (151006Z JUL 02)
  8.   10536 (151006Z JUL 02)

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UNCLASSIFIED