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used to slam Abu Zubaydah against a concrete wall).[1] The interrogators then removed the hood, performed an attention grab, and had Abu Zubaydah watch while a large confinement box was brought into the cell and laid on the floor.[2] A cable states Abu Zubaydah "was unhooded and the large confinement box was carried into the interrogation room and paced [sic] on the floor so as to appear as a coffin."[3] The interrogators then demanded detailed and verifiable information on terrorist operations planned against the United States, including the names, phone numbers, email addresses, weapon caches, and safe houses of anyone involved. CIA records describe Abu Zubaydah as appearing apprehensive. Each time Abu Zubaydah denied having additional information, the interrogators would perform a facial slap or face grab.[4] At approximately 6:20 PM, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded for the first time. Over a two-and-a-half-hour period, Abu Zubaydah coughed, vomited, and had "involuntary spasms of the torso and extremities" during waterboarding.[5] Detention site personnel noted that "throughout the process [Abu Zubaydah] was asked and given the opportunity to respond to questions about threats" to the United States, but Abu Zubaydah continued to maintain that he did not have any additional information to provide.[6] In an email to OMS leadership entitled, "So it begins," a medical officer wrote:
- "The sessions accelerated rapidly progressing quickly to the water board after large box, walling, and small box periods. [Abu Zubaydah] seems very resistant to the water board. Longest time with the cloth over his face so far has been 17 seconds. This is sure to increase shortly. NO useful information
- ↑ See email from: [REDACTED]; to: ; subject: Subject detainee allegation – per our telcon of today; date: March 28, 2007, at 04:42 PM, which states Abu Zubaydah claims "a collar was used to slam him against a concrete wall. While we do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at the site at the time confirmed that this did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at the site after the walling on the concrete wall."
- ↑ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
- ↑ 10586 (041559Z AUG 02)
- ↑ 10586 (041559Z AUG 02); 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
- ↑ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
- ↑ 10586 (041559Z AUG 02). CIA contractor DUNBAR later told the CIA OIG that "[their instructions from [chief of Base] were to focus on only one issue, that is, Zubaydah's knowledge of plans to attack the U.S." According to the OIG's record of the interview, "[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT] could ask that question in a number of ways, but it was the only theme they were authorized by [chief of Base] to use with [Abu] Zubaydah." (See February 10, 2003, interview report of Hammond DUNBAR, Office of the Inspector General.) The acting chief of Station in Country , in an interview with the CIA OIG, stated that "there were days at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] when the team had no requirements from Headquarters," and that CTC did not give the chief of Base (COB) the "flexibility as COB to ask other questions" besides those related to threats to the United States. (See May 28, 2003, interview report of , Office of the Inspector General.) The chief of Support Services at the CIA Station stated that "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] were frustrated that they kept beating Zubaydah up on the same question while getting the same physiologic response from him." (See May 21, 2003, interview report of , Office of the Inspector General.) Other interviewees described how analytical assumptions about Abu Zubaydah drove the interrogation process. (See May 22, 2003, interview report of , Office of the Inspector General; and February 27, 2003, interview report of , Office of the Inspector General.) Chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, told the OIG that "CTC subject matter experts" pointed to intelligence that they said indicated that Abu Zubaydah knew more than he was admitting and thus disagreed with the assessment from DETENTION SITE GREEN that Abu Zubaydah was "compliant." According to the OIG's record of the Jose Rodriguez interview, "disagreement between the analysts and interrogators can be healthy, but in this case Rodriguez believes that the analysts were wrong." (See interview of Jose Rodriguez, Office of the Inspector General, March 6, 2003.)
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