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the whole ground, it begins to be easier to discern its real character. What does undenominationalism, as a principle, imply?
The question, it is to be observed, is about undenominationalism as a principle. Undenominationalism as an accident is quite a different matter. By agreement among individuals for temporary purposes, it would be perfectly possible for Romanists and Anglicans in one direction, or for Congregrationalists or Plymouth Brethren and Anglicans in another, to arrange to share common lessons in some particular religious subjects. But the essence of this possibility depends altogether upon the voluntary and limited character of the alliance. It might be possible, even to a considerable extent, to fall back upon "undenominational" methods, avowedly as a pis aller, under difficult and undesirable conditions, in the teaching of schools. But undenominationalism as a positive principle, imposed without consent and without limitation; undenominationalism as a sort of higher unity, carrying with it the forcible prohibition of all distinctive teaching, in the teeth of the judgment and conscience of those to whom distinctive teaching is of essential value—it is this which is in question. What does undenominationalism, as a positive and coercive principle, imply? It implies that there is a real essence of Christianity which is capable of being detached alike from all specific forms of dogmatic conviction, and from all particular organizations of government or ministry, and from all corporate obligations of a sacred society—including, amongst other things, the whole range of sacramental experience. It implies that creeds, ministries, sacraments, corporate responsibilities, and all other such things, whether in themselves more or less desirable, are at most subordinate to, as they are in any case quite separable from, a certain central knowledge and essence of Christianity. This central core, it is con-
