together and synchronizing them with ground operations. Capitalizing on this knowledge, the Joint Staff produced a series of doctrinal publications that culminated in October 1998 with JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.
Today, Army IO doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) adapt joint IO doctrine to achieve information superiority at decisive points during full spectrum operations. Because adversaries have asymmetric abilities to counter finite friendly IO capabilities, the probability of maintaining information superiority over long periods is unlikely. Therefore, oummanders execute IO to gain information superiority at times and places where it supports their intent and concept of operations.
Technological advancements in automated INFOSYS and communications have allowed commanders to see the battlefield as actions unfold, closer to near realtime than ever before, and to rapidly pass information across their areas of operations. Combined, IO and advanced INFOSYS and communications continue to shorten the time required for staff processes. This compresses the decision cycle and increases operational tempo, the rate of milimry action. Commanders now have opportunities to achieve decisive results early in an operation, reducing casualties and conserving resources.
Advancements in automated INFOSYS und communications carry with them vulnerabilities commanders need to recognize and offset. Clearly, a force dependent on technology offers adversaries new opportunities to degrade its efféctiveness. Army forces face significant vulnerabilities due to their dependence on information technology. Army communications and technologies are becoming more and more dependent on commercial backbuoes and commercial off-the-shelf products and systems that are also readily available to potential adversaries. This situation makes defensive IO an essential aspect of all operations.