§ 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the power afforded by this provision – namely, to give an author exclusive authority over a work – rests in part on a "presuppos[ition]" that the work contains "a degree of originality." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). Congress has recognized this same point, extending copyright protection only to "original works of authorship . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added). Originality, thus, is said to be "[t]he sine qua non of copyright." Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. That is, not every work of authorship, let alone every aspect of every work of authorship, is protectable in copyright; only original expressions are protected. This constitutional and statutory principle seeks to strike a delicate balance – rewarding (and thus encouraging) those who contribute something new to society, while also allowing (and thus stimulating) others to build upon, add to, and develop those creations. The copyright power is said to exist primarily "not to reward the labor of authors, but to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. . . . To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work." Id. at 349-50 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
What exactly does it mean for a work to qualify as "original"? In Feist, the Supreme Court clarified that the work must be “independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works)." Id. at 345; see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (the work for
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